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SPACE AERO Co. v. DARLING CO.
Finally, it should be noted that legislation extant in a number of
states renders moot this entire legal problem. Under so-called permis-
sive use statutes, an owner of a vehicle is "liable for injuries to third
persons caused by the negligence of any person... , who is operating the
car on the public highway with the owner's consent."40 Where such
legislation is in effect, an inquiry into the doctrine herein discussed is
avoided.4 Maryland has no such statute, but with the decision in
Phillips v. Cook, the benefit rule is made sufficiently broad to be nearly
the judicial equivalent of such legislation as to employer's liability.
Technical Trade Secrets And Former Employees
Space Aero Products Co. v. R. E. Darling Co.'
Darling, the plaintiff, manufactures oxygen breathing hoses for
aircraft personnel. Four of the defendants were former employees
who had worked for a number of years for Darling in various capacities.
The former employees had no formal contract of employment and could
leave or be discharged at any time. In the fall of 1960, the former
employees decided to go into business in competition with Darling.
With financial backing from a former supplier of silicone products to
Darling, the defendant Space Aero Products was incorporated in
December, 1960, by the former employees, who resigned from Darling
between December 9 and December 23 of that year. Darling had
been the sole manufacturer and supplier of certain types of oxygen
breathing hoses for the U.S. Navy and had been working since April,
1960, to qualify hose under a certain military specification. Space
Aero began business operations in January, 1961; its first hose was
the same as Darling's and was built by some of the same people. Space
Aero's hose was qualified under the specification in the middle of
January, 1961, and was submitted to the Navy on February 20, 1961,
over two months ahead of the first hose Darling submitted. In May,
1961, the Navy accepted Space Aero's hose.
Darling filed suit against the defendants to enjoin them from
using the alleged trade secrets of the plaintiff in the manufacture of
the oxygen breathing hoses. The trial judge found that the former
employees had acquired the "know-how" to set up a competing busi-
40. PROSSER, TORTS § 72, at 500 (3d ed. 1964). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS §§ 26.10, 26.16 (1956). Also see RESTATEM4NT (StcoND), AGENCY § 238,
comments b, d (1958).
41. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP § 54, at 281 (1952), which states that under a per-
missive use statute "partnership liability results from operation for nonpartnership
purposes by a partner with consent of his co-partner."
1. 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
19661
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ness while working for Darling and that the former employees had
breached the duty of fidelity and trust which they owed their employer.
Ile also found that although other experienced hose manufacturers
had tried unsuccessfully to produce an oxygen breathing hose which
could compete with Darling's, the defendants, due to the knowledge
gained from Darling, were able to produce such a hose almost immedi-
ately after their company was formed. The trial court permanently
enjoined the defendants from further manufacture and/or sale of
oxygen breathing hoses manufactured to the military specification and
ordered them to deliver to the court any materials in their possession
which described or disclosed the equipment, techniques or components
used in the manufacture of the hose assemblies. On appeal, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals found that Darling's "know-how" in the manu-
facture of hoses was a trade secret and affirmed the lower court decision.
The issued raised by this case is the extent to which an employee's
personal skills and knowledge are considered trade secrets of his
employer which he cannot disclose. The balancing of the right of an
employer to protect his trade secrets against the right of an employee
to subsequently use his personal skills and knowledge has long been a
problem and is now becoming increasingly complex due to modern
technology.2 A principal part of the problem has been the difficulty
in defining "trade secrets." In the principal case, the Maryland court
employed the widely used definition set out in the Restatement of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or pre-
serving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or list
of customers.'
2. The situation is well stated in the case of E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
American Potash & Chemical Corp., 200 A.2d 428, at 437 (Del. Ch. 1964) :
The court fully recognizes that this is a case of great social and industrial
significance. . . .Among the substantial and conflicting policies at play in this
situation are the protection of employers' rights in their trade secrets on the one
hand, versus the right of the individual to exploit his talents, use matters of
general knowledge, and pursue his calling without undue hindrance from a prior
employer on the other. The law recognizes that trade secrets are entitled to
reasonable protection regardless of the supporting legal label. Reasonable legal
protection tends to encourage, as here, substantial expenditures to find or improve
ways and means of accomplishing commercial and industrial goals. The protection
of such efforts when translated into trade secrets tends to encourage such efforts
and the result is beneficial to the employer and presumably to society. However,
it is hard to ask a man to work in a trade secret area and thereby circumscribe his
possible future liberty of action and the use of the knowledge and skills which
are inextricably interwoven with his knowledge of the trade secrets.
The "interests" involved are as easy to state as they are difficult to protect,
particularly in the face of the ever-increasing complexity of present day technology.
3. RESTATEMZNr, TORTS § 757, comment b, at 5 (1939), quoted in: Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 560 (D. Conn. 1964); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v.
Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 257 (S.D. Cal. 1958) ; Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika,
145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958). See Mycalex Corp. of America v. Pemco
Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Md. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947).
See also Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 217 A.2d 375, 380
(Md. 1966).
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There have been several theories supporting the protection of
trade secrets by the courts. Originally, protection was granted to the
owner on the basis that the trade secret was a property right." Now,
however, the confidential relationship existing between employer and
employee is generally considered to be the primary source of protection.
As Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
The starting point for the present matter is not property or
due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential
relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them. These have given
place to hostility, and the first thing to be made sure of is that
the defendant shall not fraudulently abuse the trust reposed in
him. It is the usual incident of confidential relations. If there is
any disadvantage in the fact that he knew the plaintiffs' secrets,
he must take the burden with the good.5
Thus, the essence of the action is the breach of faith, and, therefore,
it is of no importance that the defendant could have gained access
to the trade secret by legitimate means if he wished.8 The various
doctrinal labels used to protect, however, are of little importance as
long as the courts realize the value of trade secrets and give them this
protection. 7 But this protection is limited, since it is unquestionably
lawful to gain possession of a competitor's unpatented product by
proper means and, through inspection and analysis, create a duplicate.'
In determining the existence of trade secrets, the courts generally
look at secrecy and various technical factors.' The courts, including
4. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30,
23 N.E. 12 (1889).
5. E. I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917),
cited in: Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 261 (S.D. Cal.
1958) ; Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 547, 574 (D.
Md. 1955), aff'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1956).
6. See, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953); Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 562 (D. Conn. 1964); Head Ski Co. v.
Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958). See also RESTATZMENT, TORTS § 757
(1939), which sets out liability for use of a trade secret without permission.
7. Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. Rgv.
437, 440 n.28 (1960). The protection offered a trade secret is both greater and less
than that afforded to a patent. The trade secret's protection is greater because it is
not limited to a fixed number of years and does not require the strict patent standards
for novelty and invention. Trade secret protection is less than that afforded to a
patent in that actual secrecy and impropriety in the method of procuring the secrets
are both prerequisites to the protection of a trade secret. Mycalex Corp. of America
v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Md. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir.
1947). For the rationale behind the protection of both trade secrets and patents, see
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment a at 2-4 (1939).
8. Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12, at 13 (1889). See Smith v.
Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953) which cites NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION AND TRADEMARKS § 148 (1947).
9. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b at 6 (1939), cited with approval in
Space Aero, 238 Md. at 110, 208 A.2d at 82, breaks down these requirements into
six factors: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside the business;(2) the extent to which it is known by the employees and others involved in the busi-
ness; (3) the extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information; (4)
the value of the information to the business and its competitors; (5) the amount of
effort or money expended in its development; (6) the ease or difficulty with which
others could properly acquire or duplicate the information. See Manos v. Melton, 358
Mich. 500, 100 N.W.2d 235, 238-39 (1960), citing ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 239, at
324-25 (1953).
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Maryland's, have not found absolute secrecy to be essential and have
usually endorsed some form of qualified secrecy."l However, if the
plaintiff has voluntarily disclosed the information or if the facts in-
volved are the subject of public knowledge or general knowledge in
the trade, then any right to protection disappears."
There has been considerable conflict among the courts as to the
application of the technical requirements for trade secrets. In some
cases a process found without lengthy and expensive research will not
be granted protection as a trade secret.' 2 Other cases, however, have
set up standards that allow protection for simple discoveries made from
commonly known components.' 3 The value of the information to the
employer and to the former employees should also be considered.14
Novelty has been unduly stressed by some courts, with the resultant
standard appearing more like that for a patent than for a trade secret.' 5
The presence of a covenant to keep confidential information secret has
little effect; the courts, in finding a trade secret, must necessarily find
10. RESTATE MENT, TORTS § 757, comment b at 5-6 (1939). See Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671, 192 N.Y.S.2d 102, 119 (Sup.Ct. 1959), which required the secrecy to be such that there would be difficulty in
others properly acquiring the information. Space Aero is in accord, 238 Md. at 109-10,208 A.2d at 82. See Mycalex Corp. of America v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420,
at 423 (D. Md. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947).
In the present case, defendants argued that the doors to Darling's plant wereleft open and workers were permitted to have visitors during the time when the
hose was being assembled. But the court nevertheless found the requisite secrecy,
saying, 238 Md. at 112, 208 A.2d at 83-84:
Darling's plant was located not in one of the country's great industrial centers,
but in a relatively small, if growing community. The testimony, taken as a
whole, convinces us that Darling took precautions to guard the secrecy of itsprocess which, under the circumstances, were reasonably sufficient. In its par-
ticular community and environment, it may well be that Darling considered that
too elaborate efforts at concealment would call attention to what was being con-
cealed, as in Poe's "Purloined Letter." In any event . . . no one else succeeded
in making hoses according to the Darling process. Until the formation of Space
Aero by Darling's former employees, Darling's efforts at secrecy, like the process
itself, met the basic criterion of success.
Cf. Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 117 Atl. 753, 23 A.L.R. 420(1922), quoted in Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958).
11. National Starch Products v. Polymer Industries, 273 App. Div. 732, 79N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (1948). "A trade secret owner, however, does not abandon his
secret by a limited public publication for a restricted purpose." Space Aero Products
Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. at 110, 208 A.2d at 82 (1965).
A recent Maryland case, Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc.,
217 A.2d 375, 380 (Md. 1966), in holding that there was no trade secret, placed the
burden of proof of the element of secrecy on the proponent of the trade secret.
12. E.g., Manos v. Melton, 358 Mich. 500, 100 N.W.2d 230, at 238-39 (1960). See
Note, Industrial Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U.L. R~v. 324, 337-39(1963).
13. See, e.g., 0. A. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531,
538-39 (6th Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1935).
14. Manos v. Melton, 358 Mich. 500, 100 N.W.2d 235 (1960), has been criticized
for the court's heavy reliance on the cost factor in a situation where the value of theinformation to both the former employer and the competitor was quite high. The
court failed to consider the value as a factor. Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 324, 337 (1963).
15. See, e.g., Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250,265-66 (S.D. Cal. 1958). But see Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549,
560-62 (D. Conn. 1964); Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L.
Rev. 583, 590-92 (1961) ; Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 324, 338-41 (1963).
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the existence of a fiduciary relationship, regardless of whether a formal
covenant has been made."6
In using these factors to determine the existence of a trade secret,
the courts will also take into consideration the extent to which the
information may be part of the employee's personal skills and knowl-
edge, which the employer cannot prevent him from using. 7 The
problem has been well stated in the present Maryland case:
The development of the law of trade secrets is a result of
balancing two conflicting elements essential to our society. There
is a strong policy favoring free competition; an employee is en-
titled to use the skill and knowledge of his trade or profession
which he has learned in the course of his employment, for the
benefit of himself and the public, if he does not violate a contractual
or fiduciary obligation in doing so. ... On the other hand, in order
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, the law
provides certain protections to an originator. Among these pro-
tections are the patent and copyright statutes and the law of torts
prohibiting unfair competition. The law protecting trade secrets
is another protection.'
Thus, the rule is simply that the former employee can use the skills
and knowledge he learned during the employment, but he has a duty
not to use the trade secrets of his former employer.' 9 The rule is
straightforward; the difficulty occurs in its application when the former
employee's skills and knowledge are closely interwoven with the em-
ployer's trade secrets. 20
16. E.g., Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442, 446 (1954)
Sealectro Corp. v. Tefco Electronics, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 11, 223 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238
(Sup. Ct. 1961). See also DeLong Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104, 126 (S.D. N.Y.
1959) and Note, 39 NoT DAMs LAW. 200, 204-06 (1964).
17. See note 2 supra.
18. Space Aero Products Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 113, 208 A.2d
74, 84 (1965). In Midland-Ross v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 412 (3d Cir. 1961), the
court states:
We have before us in this case two perfectly well established principles. One
is that an employee after leaving the service of an employer may carry on the
same business on his own and use for his own benefit the things he has learned
while in the earlier employment. If this were not so an apprentice who has
worked up through the stages of journeyman and master workman could never
become an entrepreneur on his own behalf. Any such system of quasi-serfdom
has long since passed away. Necessarily the former employee may use what he
learned in the former employer's business while engaged in business for himself
or in some business competing with the former employer....
Equally clear is the proposition that the employee owes a duty of loyalty to
the employer. He must not, while employed, act contrary to the employer's
interests and, in general terms, owes a duty of loyalty as one of the incidents of
the employer-employee relationship.
See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 564 (D. Conn. 1964), quoting
with approval Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A. 2d 442, 447 (1954).
19. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958).
20. See, e.g., Manos v. Melton, 358 Mich. 500, 100 N.W.2d 235 (1960). The court
in Sperry Rand attempted to separate the two when it stated, 241 F. Supp. at 564:
For example, how certain chemicals affect certain metals, what procedures
insure a clean environment and what do not, etc., are things learned from [the
1966]
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The most common situation has been where the employer has
taught his former employee trade secrets which were developed prior
to his employment. The cases generally grant the employer protection. 2'
The unfairness of any other alternative is usually quite evident, and
the goal of higher commercial morality is often pronounced.22 Here,
where the employee's rights to his skills and knowledge must be weighed
against his employer's rights in pre-existing trade secrets, the courts
seem to have little difficulty basing their decisions on the technical
ground of the presence of a trade secret.
A more troublesome situation, however, arises where the former
employee has helped the employer develop the trade secrets in question.
For example, in Wexler v. Greenberg23 the defendant Greenberg worked
as plaintiff's chief chemist and spent one-half of his time doing research
to analyze competitors' products and using the information to develop
new formulas. He quit working for the plaintiff and, using plaintiff's
formulas, began working for a competitor. The Pennsylvania court
noted that the plaintiff did not disclose the alleged trade secrets to
Greenberg during his service or because of his position, but Greenberg
himself had developed the formulas.24 The court, holding that it was
impossible to find an implied pledge to keep secret a formula which
the employee himself had developed,25 found no duty of non-disclosure.
The court relied upon the fact that the formulas were not specific
projects of great concern but rather part of Greenberg's routine work
of changing and modifying competitors' formulas. 26 It also noted that
Greenberg had "never engaged in any [basic] research nor conducted
any experiments nor created any formula" for the plaintiff and that
his work did not require any great assistance or expense. All of this
indicated to the court that there was nothing to show Greenberg that
defendants'] experiences at Sperry and become a part of their intellectual equip-
ment. But their knowledge of the end products of their work there, the combina-
tion of apparatus and equipment, materials and procedures which made up the
Sperry Process for the manufacture of its superior quality transistor, in short,
the things about the process which were the secret of Sperry's success, were
information which the defendants could not use or impart to others without
breaching their fiduciary duty to Sperry.
21. E.g., By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329
P.2d 147 (1958) ; Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615(1964) ; Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946) ; Sun Dial Corp. v.
Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954). See also Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana,
293 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1961). But where the former employer cannot prove that his
ex-employee used any trade secrets, then, in the absence of a covenant not to compete,
the employee can use any skills and knowledge he possesses. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rapp,
3 Misc. 2d 1011, 226 N.Y.S.2d 562, 564 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
22. E.g., Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615, 617,
620 (1964).
23. 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
24. 160 A.2d at 433.
25. Id. at 434. The court's theory was that in the normal case, "the trust and
confidence upon which legal relief is predicated stems from the instance of the
employer's turning over to the employee the pre-existing trade secret," and it is then
that the implied pledge of secrecy is extracted from the employee. The Wexler court,
however, noted that these circumstances were not present and could find no way "to
elicit an implied pledge of secrecy from the sole act of an employee turning over to
his employer a trade secret which he, the employee, has developed." Ibid.
26. Id. at 436.
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his employer expected him to find the formulas for its exclusive use.
The court carefully distinguished two similar cases from other juris-
dictions on the basis that the former employees in those cases knew
that their work was directed toward a specific goal desired by their
employers, and, therefore, an implied agreement to keep the work con-
fidential could be found.2 7 Thus, with considerable talk about employee
mobility, the court held that Greenberg was merely using his technical
knowledge and skills which he had increased while working for
the plaintiff.
28
On the other hand, in Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co.,29 a Maryland
District Court case, the defendants helped the plaintiff develop an
adhesively bonded metallic ski. They then sought to go into business
for themselves, using as a basis the knowledge they had learned while
working for the plaintiff. The District Court held that the defendants
never would have produced their ski at all but for the knowledge they
acquired from the plaintiff, and it granted a permanent injunction
against the manufacture of any adhesively bonded skis by the defen-
dants.8 0 Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein5 ' is a similar case, in which
the court stated, "The fact that it was the defendants who developed
the process gives them no greater right to use it in competition with
the plaintiff than that of any other employee."81
2
27. Id. at 435-36, where the court discussed Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 202
Misc. 529, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1952), and Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co.
v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307, 16 A.L.R. 1170 (1921).
28. Id. at 433. It has been suggested that it would have been more logical for
the court to find that Greenberg's work was as specifically directed as it could have
been toward the discovery of formulas of commercial value and that the contemplation
of the parties must have been for the results to belong exclusively to the employer.
TURNER, THE LAW op TRADE SECRETS 168 (1962); Note, Competitive Torts, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 888, 953 (1964); Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 324, 341-42 (1963). But it has
also been suggested that in the absence of any understanding as to the discoveries, the
employer would have carried on the research regardless of how long the secrets could
be kept, and the added incentive resulting from trade secret protection did not war-
rant the restrictions on employee mobility and dissemination of technical knowledge.
77 HARV. L. Rgv. at 953.
Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962),
is a similar case involving an engineer working on valves for guided missiles and
rockets. The court found no trade secrets were involved and quoted extensively from
the opinion in Wexler. See also Gabriel Co. v. Talley Indus., 137 U.S.P.Q. 630
(D. Ariz. 1963); Tempo Instrument, Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
N.Y. 1964).
29. 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958).
30. Id. at 924. For remedies generally available to the former employer, see
Klein, supra note 7, at 448 (1960) ; Note, Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888,
957-59 (1964) ; 39 NoTRE DAME LAW. 200, 206-09 (1964).
In the case of B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d
99 (1963), the defendant, a former employee who accepted a job with plaintiff's
competitor, was enjoined from using plaintiff's trade secrets in his new job. The
defendant had stated that once he was a member of the plaintiff's competitor, lie
would expect to use all of the knowledge that he had to their benefit. The injunction
was based on the defendant's fiduciary duty and was issued where there existed "a
present real threat of disclosure, ...without actual disclosure." 192 N.E.2d at 105.
The court also stated that there were additional grounds for the injunction in the
written contract the defendant signed, which bound him not to misuse the confidential
knowledge he acquired while employed by the plaintiff.
31. 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
32. Id. at 564-65.
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There are, then, two prevailing schools of thought governing
the situation where the former employee is the developer of the trade
secret. The rule in Wexler clearly takes into consideration the policy
of allowing free movement of skilled technical employees."8 However,
the rule in Head Ski Co. and Sperry Rand seeks to protect the interest
of the employer in the trade secrets and refuses to make any distinction
where the employee himself did the research. Those cases enforced
the fiduciary duty, even at the expense of the former employee's skills.8 4
The Head Ski rule allowing stricter protection of trade secrets is
probably the more desirable one, assuming that the employee had
adequate warning that the information in question was confidential.3 5
A primary reason for the protection of trade secrets is the fostering of
research and development to promote technological advancement; with-
out such protection, employers would be extremely reluctant to make
the the large expenditures that are required.86 This is especially true
where the innovations may prove to be non-patentable, and competitors
could find it easier and cheaper to hire a knowledgeable employee than
to develop the innovation with their own resources. It has been sug-
33. Wexler states its policy, 160 A.2d at 433:
In this era of electronic, chemical, missile and atomic development, many
skilled technicians and expert employees are currently in the process of develop-
ing potential trade secrets. Competition for personnel of this caliber is excep-
tionally keen, and the interchange of employment is commonplace. One has but
to reach for his daily newspaper to appreciate the current market for such skilled
employees. We must therefore be particularly mindful of any effect our decision
in this case might have in disrupting this pattern of employee mobility, both in
view of possible restraints upon an individual in the pursuit of his livelihood and
the harm to the public in general in forestalling, to any extent, widespread
technological advances.
See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Corp., 350 F.2d 134, 137-38(9th Cir. 1965) ; Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 324, 342-43 (1963) ; 74 HARV. L. Rtv. 1473
(1961).
34. In Sperry Rand the court stated, 241 F. Supp. at 564:
The defendants claim that a large contributing factor in the production of a
superior transistor was the defendant's adroitness and skill in operating the
process; but even if this were so, it would not effect a transfer of the right to a
trade secret in the process itself from Sperry to the defendants or excuse them
for a breach of the confidence entrusted to them.
See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Corp., supra note 33, at 138.
35. See Note, Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. Rv. 888, 951-52 (1964), where it
is suggested that the employer be responsible for warning the employee about post-
employment use of any information he may have learned or developed.
36. 241 F. Supp. at 564. See Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 324, 328-30 (1963). In
Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th
Cir. 1965), the court considered this contention but concluded that the rationale of
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), "precludes judicial
recognition of a legally protectible interest in the secrecy of industrial information
as such, as distinguished from an interest in the integrity of confidential employer-
employee relationships." The court made an analogy to the federal patent statutes
which "require full disclosure of the invention as a condition to the grant of monopoly
so that at the end of the period of monopoly the development may be freely available
to all." Thus the court recognized "a congressional determination that any individual
or social interests which may be served by secrecy are outweighed by those served
by full disclosure," and therefore it followed under the Sears rationale "that 'state
law providing protection for trade secrets cannot be applied to serve a premise that
the balance of interests favors secrecy. The protection is merely against breach of
faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret'." 350 F.2d at 138 n.2.
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gested, however, that trade secret protection is unnecessary because
research will be carried on regardless of whether trade secrets are pro-
tected.$7 Although this argument might have some merit in the situa-
tion where the employer must develop certain innovations in order to
remain competitive, it would seem to have little application in cases
involving basic research. As previously noted, it has also been argued
that both employee mobility and the spread of useful knowledge would
be hampered through strict protection of the fiduciary relationship. 8
The mobility of employees is probably more dependent upon the em-
ployee's own skills and knowledge than his knowledge of the former
employer's trade secrets. 9 It is true that the spread of knowledge may
well be suppressed in the short run; however, if there is a sufficient
advantage in possessing a trade secret, the competitors of its possessor
will have increased incentive to discover it, and their research may even
lead them to superior solutions.
The Maryland court in Space Aero made no mention of the fact
that the former employees may have helped to develop the trade secret ;4o
it primarily concerned itself with finding one. Once the trade secret
was found, the court merely enforced the former employees' fiduciary
duty not to disclose it." Thus the court followed the principles set
down by the earlier federal cases which arose in Maryland42 and
emphasized the protection of the employer's trade secrets. The court
did not consider employee mobility, probably because the behavior of
the former employees was thought to be such a clear violation of their
fiduciary duty.4" However, it does not appear likely that the Maryland
courts would adopt the reasoning of Wexler v. Greenberg even in an
equivalent fact situation, since the weight of authority favors the pro-
tection of the fiduciary relationship over the mobility of the technical
employee.
37. See 77 HARV. L. Rev. at 953.
38. See note 33 supra.
39. A particularly difficult and increasingly common situation arises where the
employee's skills and knowledge are so intertwined with his employer's trade secrets
that the two have become inseparable. In the case of highly trained scientific per-
sonnel, this could mean that an employee could offer for the use of a new employer
only his technologically obsolete knowledge. This results in tying the employee to
a single employer by destroying his bargaining power with any prospective new em-ployers. Cf. Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
40. See Brief for Appellant, p. 7, Space Aero Products Co. v. R. E. Darling Co.,238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965), where it is stated that none of the former employees
involved were highly educated research employees.
41. 238 Md. at 117, 208 A.2d at 86.
42. Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958); CarterProducts, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1955).
43. The court pointed to the fact that the former employees had actually taken
drawings and other materials relating to the hose from Darling's plant. This demon-
strated that they "knew that they were acting wrongfully in violation of their con-fidential relationship and their duty of loyalty." 238 Md. at 117, 208 A.2d at 86.
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